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ABSTRACT
Active power distribution networks require sophisticated mo-
nitoring and control strategies for efficient energy manage-
ment and automatic adaptive reconfiguration of the power
infrastructure. Such requirements are realised by deploying
a large number of various electronic automation and com-
munication field devices, such as Phasor Measurement Units
(PMUs) or Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), and a reli-
able two-way communication infrastructure that facilitates
transfer of sensor data and control signals. In this paper,
we perform a detailed threat analysis in a typical active dis-
tribution network’s automation system. We also propose
mechanisms by which we can design a secure and reliable
communication network for an active distribution network
that is resilient to insider and outsider malicious attacks,
natural disasters, and other unintended failure. The pro-
posed security solution also guarantees that an attacker is
not able to install a rogue field device by exploiting an emer-
gency situation during islanding.
General Terms
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1. INTRODUCTION
Conventional power distribution networks are passive and
are characterised by unidirectional power flows with a min-
imum level of centralised monitoring and control strategies.
However, the large-scale penetration of embedded distri-
buted energy resources and the introduction of energy stor-
age at the distribution premises is paving way for the emer-
gence of active distribution networks (ADNs). An active
distribution network is a distribution network with local en-
ergy generation, storage capabilities and bidirectional power
flow; it requires more sophisticated active monitoring and
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control strategies. An active distribution network is divided
into a subset of loosely-coupled autonomous regional con-
trollers that can perform monitoring and control actions for
their geographical subnetwork [23]. Under normal circum-
stances, each subnetwork is connected to the main power
grid and each autonomous controller is able to cooperate
with peer controllers when necessary. Inter-domain commu-
nication among autonomous controllers is necessary for de-
tecting unexpected power system failures and other anoma-
lous conditions in adjacent regions or in the main grid.
In most extreme cases, when a controller detects a wide-
spread disturbance or power failure, the active distribution
subnetwork within the controller’s domain can automati-
cally isolate itself from the grid and continue to operate as
an island. The power demand within the island is then sup-
plied by the local energy generation and storage until the
island back-synchronises with the grid when the faults are
resolved [4]. During this islanding process, power flow con-
trol and voltage and frequency regulations are carried out by
the autonomous island controller (IC) in coordination with
sensing and actuating devices deployed within the island.
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Figure 1: An active distribution network where the
sensing and control cyber infrastructure is superim-
posed on the physical power system infrastructure
(adopted from [8]). Different possible islanding con-
figurations are shown such that an island can be a
superset of islands depending on where the fault oc-
curs.
Figure 1 illustrates the cyber-physical nature of a typical
active distribution network where the sensing and control
cyber infrastructure is superimposed on the physical power
system infrastructure to facilitate the sophisticated automa-
tion operations (monitoring, control and protection) of the
distribution network. A sophisticated automation system
at the distribution level requires deployment of a large num-
ber of electronic data-acquisition and actuating field devices,
which are nonexistent today [7]. Moreover, a high-speed and
reliable two-way communication infrastructure is required to
facilitate a real-time transfer of sensor data and control sig-
nals.
The increasing reliance of distribution network operations
on pervasive electronic automation devices and on commu-
nication networks poses an unprecedented challenge in pro-
tecting the system against cyber incidents. Cyber incidents
can be intentional or unintentional. Unintentional cyber in-
cidents can occur due to natural disasters, system failures
or human errors, whereas intentional cyber incidents occur
due to deliberate attacks from outsiders or insiders.
An attacker has a wide range of options to compromise
a distribution automation. For example, many of the elec-
tronic automation (sensing and actuating) devices are field-
deployed in remote locations where there is little protec-
tion against intruders. Moreover, the communication in-
frastructure for an active distribution network spans a large
geographic area. Hence some of the communication cables
are likely to pass through physically insecure locations, thus
providing an attacker physical access to the network. Fur-
thermore, grid operators are increasingly adopting IP-based
communication standards and commercial off-the-shelf hard-
ware and software in their networks for interoperability and
for cost reduction reasons. Such standards and products are
well studied by attackers and are known to be vulnerable
to network attacks such as IP spoofing and denial of service
(DoS) attacks.
Given such a range of vulnerability points, a malicious
attacker can launch sophisticated attacks to cause maximum
damage on the distribution network. An attacker can, for
example, launch a coordinated cyber-physical attack by first
physically destroying a critical component of the grid (e.g.,
one of the distributed generators) and simultaneously (or
with very little time difference) attack the communication
infrastructure that transfers information about the status of
the critical component. This way, the operator will not know
about the state of the damaged component and thus will
not take any corrective actions. With no corrective actions
taken, such an attack can have a cascading effect, causing
a blackout. Although not due to a malicious attack, the
North-East American blackout of 2003 was caused mainly
because of lack of system-state awareness by an operator.
Although both insiders and outsiders can attack a dis-
tribution automation system, insider attacks are more dan-
gerous than outsider attacks mainly because an insider has
better access privileges and has better information about
internal-procedures and potential weak spots in the automa-
tion system. In general, protecting a system against insider
attacks is very difficult. However, implementing automated
security tools and techniques to detect and identify suspi-
cious activities from insiders can minimise the level of dam-
age.
The main contribution of this paper is to thoroughly assess
insider and outsider security threats against a power distri-
bution automation system and propose a check-list of secu-
rity solutions and best practices to counter such threats. The
proposed solution guarantees secure operations even when a
sub-domain of the distribution network operates in an is-
landed mode by preventing outsider attackers and malicious
insiders from installing a rogue field device by exploiting the
emergency situation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the
following section we identify possible cyber-security threats
in a typical active distribution network. In Section 4 we
discuss security solutions and best practices that should be
implemented to counter the identified security threats. In
Section 5 we detail a secure device installation mechanism
that guarantees only authorised field engineers can install
field devices from accredited device manufacturers. We also
devise an extension to the scheme that can be used to se-
curely install field devices during an emergency situation
when communication with a user authentication facility is
not available from the installation location.
2. RELATEDWORK
Smart Grid security has recently received a lot of atten-
tion both from the research community and standardisation
bodies. The NISTIR 7628 [15], “Guidelines for Cyber Secu-
rity in the Smart Grid” standard provides a comprehensive
set of guidelines for designing cyber-security mechanisms or
systems for the smart grid. The standard proposes meth-
ods for assessing risks in the smart grid, and then identifies
and applies appropriate security requirements to mitigate
these risks. NIST has also released a draft on Cyber Se-
curity Framework for critical infrastructure [13], which is
now available for review. This draft follows a risk-based
approach to secure critical infrastructures, as opposed to
the process-based approach proposed by Langner in [16].
The latter approach stresses that maximising security ca-
pability is a prerequisite for security assurance of a critical
infrastructure. The IEC 62351 standard series [14], devel-
oped by WG15 of IEC TC57, defines security mechanisms to
protect communication protocols for substation systems, in
particular, IEC 60870 and IEC 61850. The primary focus of
this standardisation is to provide end-to-end security. The
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) set of standards [1]
developed by the North American Electric Reliability Cor-
poration (NERC) aims at introducing compliance require-
ments to enforce baseline cyber-security efforts throughout
the bulk power system (transmission).
A large number of publications have also addressed smart
grid security as a research problem. [2, 12, 18, 19] define
smart grid as a cyber-physical system (CPS) and identify
unique security challenges and issues encountered in such
systems that are not prevalent in traditional IT security.
They also discuss security solutions to address these unique
challenges. [21] proposes a layered security framework for
protecting power grid automation systems against cyber at-
tacks. The security framework satisfies the desired perfor-
mance in terms of modularity, scalability, extendibility, and
manageability and protects the smart grid against attacks
from either Internet or internal network via integrating se-
curity agents, security switches and security managements.
Metke et al. in [11] propose a security solution for smart grid
utilising PKI along with trusted computing. The paper sug-
gests automation tools be used to ease management of the
different PKI components such as registration authorities
(RA), certificate authorities (CA). A comprehensive survey
of smart grid security requirements and possible vulnera-
bilities and potential cyber attacks is provided in [20] and
[22]. They also discuss existing security solutions to counter
cyber attacks on the smart grid.
In spite of the rich set of publications and standardis-
ation on smart grid security, no work has, to our best of
knowledge, addressed security challenges associated with an
ADN’s islanded operation in the presence of a malicious in-
sider. In addition to proposing state of the art security solu-
tions to the well known security issues in an ADN automa-
tion system, we also propose a scheme that prevents outsider
attackers and malicious insiders from installing a rogue field
device by exploiting the emergency situation during island-
ing.
3. THREAT ANALYSIS
An appropriate security architecture for an active distri-
bution network can be determined only after a thorough
threat analysis of the network architecture, information flow
and security of each of the infrastructure’s components. Cy-
ber attacks can happen anywhere in a distribution automa-
tion system including at field devices (sensing and actuating
devices), communication infrastructure (routers, switches
etc) and at the control and monitoring centre.
Although different techniques can be used to launch cyber
attacks on any of these components, the ultimate goal of an
attacker is either to initiate erroneous control actions or to
prevent or delay required control actions, thereby disrupting
the proper operations of the physical power system. Erro-
neous control actions can happen either due to compromised
sensor data fed to the control centre or due to a malicious
injection or modification of the control signal. Likewise, an
inability to send timely control signals can happen either
due to absence of timely sensor data or due to control sig-
nals being maliciously dropped or delayed in the network.
In the following, we discuss different possible attack vectors
that can be exploited by an attacker to realise the stated
goals.
3.1 Unauthorized Access
Although most field devices are usually located in a rela-
tively secure location, physical access by an adversary can-
not be completely ruled out. Even if devices are physically
inaccessible, an adversary can still manage to gain access to
a device through the network unless there is a secure perime-
ter that prevents unauthorised access to the communication
infrastructure.
An adversary who gains local or remote access to a field
device can reconfigure it such that it behaves in an unde-
sirable way. An adversary can, for example, configure a
metering device, such as a PMU, to stream incorrect pha-
sor data so that the controller will have incorrect situational
awareness about the system. Moreover, an adversary can
misconfigure an actuating device to perform inaccurate ac-
tions in response to commands from a controller.
3.2 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
An adversary who intrudes in the communication channel
of a distribution network can launch a man-in-the-middle at-
tack by selectively dropping or modifying sensor data (con-
trol signals) sent from a field device (controller), thus com-
promising the availability and/or integrity of message ex-
changes. A replay attack is another form of the man-in-
the-middle attack: an attacker sniffing the communication
channel can copy measurement data or control commands
and forward them later on. Replay attacks can have catas-
trophic consequences especially when applied to control sig-
nals.
Note that man-in-the-middle attacks on measurement data
are effective mainly if the attack is persistent. This is be-
cause the system is a dynamic system, i.e., measurement
data are continuously refreshed by a new set of measure-
ments. Thus the effect of a single man-in-the-middle attack
is negligible, especially for synchrophasor measurements that
are refreshed several times per second. On the contrary, a
single attack on control signals can be catastrophic.
3.3 Rogue Device Installation
A metering field device, such as PMU, comprises sensors
that sample analogue signals from the power system and a
computing component that converts the sampled analogue
signals to digital data. An attacker who has physical access
to a metering device can tamper with the sensor and replace
it with a rogue sensor that provides incorrect signals to the
computing part of the field device. Similar attacks also apply
to actuators. An attacker can replace an actuator with a
rogue one that incorrectly acknowledges it has performed a
certain control action, whereas in reality it has not.
Implementing cryptographic solutions that ensure device
authentication before any meaningful communication starts
can prevent an attacker from installing a field device. How-
ever, attacks that involve physical tampering of only the
analogue component of field devices are difficult to prevent.
The best that can be done to prevent such attacks is to
harden the physical protection of the devices. Bad-data de-
tection techniques at the control centre can be employed to
filter out bad measurements from rogue sensors. However,
it has been shown that existing bad-data detection (BDD)
techniques do not always detect all bad measurements. Liu
et al. [10] have shown that an intelligent adversary with
knowledge of the power system model can corrupt a care-
fully selected set of sensor data to introduce arbitrary errors
in the estimates of certain state variables without triggering
an alarm from the BDD. A wrong state estimator output
can, for example, falsely indicate a significant voltage drop
(hike) in a bus, triggering the utility to inject more (less)
reactive power to the bus, which may in turn have a catas-
trophic effect on the stable operation of the grid [9].
3.4 Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
An attacker who manages to gain access to the communi-
cation infrastructure, either remotely or locally, can launch
a denial-of-service (DoS) attack by flooding a critical link
with bogus traffic or by saturating the computing resources
of a critical network device such as a router or metering field
device. Such an attack causes real-time measurement data
from field devices to be delayed or at worst dropped. As a
result, a DNO will not have a complete view of the distribu-
tion network’s status, leading to incorrect decision making.
Likewise, the attack can also delay or drop critical control
signals from a controller.
3.5 Malicious Software Patching
Smart grid devices, such as PMUs, run software and firm-
ware that need to be updated in order to patch bugs, to
fix security vulnerabilities or to add new features for better
usability or performance. Unless necessary authentication
and integrity checks are performed during update, an at-
tacker can use deceptive methods to install a malicious code
(a malware) that masquerades as a legitimate software up-
date. What is worse, a malicious insider (field engineer) can
deliberately install compromised software update to field de-
vices.
A malicious code (malware) can be used by an attacker
to perform any kind of malicious activities. For example,
it can be implemented as a “logic bomb” such that it runs
in parallel to the legitimate code and sets off a malicious
function when a specified condition is met. Stuxnet [5] is
one such example of a sophisticated logic bomb believed to
be designed to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities by specifically
targeting Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) made by
Siemens.
4. SECURITY SOLUTIONS
The cyber threats discussed in the previous section are
by no means exhaustive, but they serve to illustrate risks to
help us develop a secure distribution network. The first step
towards securing a distribution network is to separate the
automation network from the enterprise network of a DNO
and to maintain a secure perimeter around the automation
network. A security perimeter is achieved by using a secu-
rity gateway (a perimeter firewall) that provides a protective
barrier from incoming (outgoing) traffic to (from) the au-
tomation network. Moreover, internal firewalls should also
be used to provide more specific protection to certain parts
of the automation network. All firewalls should be deployed
with tightly configured rule bases such that the default pol-
icy is to “deny everything”, and then open up only what is
needed (maintain a white list). Figure 2 depicts a logical
positioning of firewalls in a typical distribution automation
network.
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Figure 2: Logical positioning of firewalls in a distri-
bution automation network.
Maintaining a secure perimeter and deploying firewalls is
not sufficient to secure a distribution automation network for
two reasons. First, security perimeters can fail, either due
to misconfiguration or due to inherent weaknesses in the
defense mechanism of the firewall. Second, a distribution
network spans a large geographic area. Hence, it is imprac-
tical to define the perimeter as an attacker has a large attack
space to physically connect to the distribution network and
launch the attack from within the network.
Therefore, it is desirable to design a security framework
that prevents attacks that emanate both from within the
distribution network and from external networks. To ad-
dress the security threats discussed in the previous section,
we propose a set of security solutions and best practices dis-
cussed below.
4.1 Centralized User Authentication
Access to all devices and services should be limited only
to authorised personnel. Each person authorised to access a
device or a service has to have a separate user account and
a secure password. All user accounts are centrally managed
in a central authentication, authorisation, and accounting
(AAA) server. All standard security policies such as role
based access control, putting a limit on the number of unsuc-
cessful access attempts, specifying password strength rules,
etc should be enforced.
Creating and managing user accounts in a central server
reduces the burden of creating and managing several ac-
counts in each device for every authorised employee. A user’s
account can also be blocked from a single location when nec-
essary. An employee’s account can be blocked when he is no
longer responsible for the tasks he was initially assigned to,
when he leaves his job or when he is suspected as malicious
based on a postmortem analysis of activity logs.
4.2 End-to-End Secure Delivery of Messages
Guaranteeing end-to-end security for message exchanges
is essential for preventing man-in-the-middle attacks and for
detecting messages from rogue devices. End-to-end secu-
rity encompasses guaranteeing the confidentiality, integrity,
source authenticity and freshness of measurements, control
signals and other important message exchanges at all lay-
ers. Although confidentiality is not a critical requirement
for measurement and control messages, a distribution net-
work operator (DNO) may want to protect its sensor data’s
confidentiality in case such data contains information sensi-
tive to the market that could be exploited by competitors.
Time-stamping, which is already part of existing SCADA
communication protocols, is used to guarantee message fresh-
ness. For protocols that do not support time-stamping, se-
quence numbers can be used as an alternative. A systematic
use of IPsec, TLS or other standard protocols can guarantee
message source authenticity, integrity and confidentiality.
4.3 Scalable Key Management
Secure end-to-end communication depends on the exis-
tence of a secret key shared between communicating parties.
Manual provisioning of such keys and updating them when
necessary in a smart grid network, where there is a large
number of communicating devices, can be unsafe and cum-
bersome. Therefore, it is crucial to design a secure and scal-
able key management scheme to generate, distribute and up-
date the shared cryptographic keys. NISTIR 7628 [15], the
foundation document for the architecture of the US Smart
Grid, mentions key management as one of the most impor-
tant research areas in smart grid security.
There is a general consensus in the smart grid research
community that Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a viable
solution as a key management scheme [3, 11]. For distri-
bution automation systems, a DNO should support its own
PKI architecture and be responsible for its devices’ certifi-
cate management. Each communicating device in the dis-
tribution network is issued a digital certificate during instal-
lation by the DNO’s certificate authority (CA). The exact
procedure of how a DNO’s certificate authority issues a cer-
tificate to a device is described in Section 5.
Once devices are issued digital certificates, they authenti-
cate each other’s identities using standard protocols such as
Transport Layer Security (TLS). Following the authentica-
tion phase, the communicating parties use a key agreement
protocol such as Diffie-Hellman to derive a session key that is
used to secure messages exchanged during the TLS session.
A device requires the public key of the DNO’s certificate
authority (trust anchor) to verify the other party’s certifi-
cate. Therefore, devices have to store the root CA’s public
key in a secure location where an adversary cannot delete
or modify it. Protecting such sensitive information using
file system permissions can be bypassed. An alternative and
more efficient solution to protecting sensitive information
such as cryptographic keys is to use tamper-proof, special-
purpose hardware tokens such as the Trusted Platform Mod-
ule (TPM).
4.4 Secure Software Patching
Attacks that exploit software patches in order to inject
malicious code (malware) can be thwarted by requiring a
device to validate the authenticity and integrity of any soft-
ware prior to installation. A DNO has to have its own ap-
proval body that approves and signs software patches from
device manufacturers or third party developers. Whenever a
device in the DNO’s network installs a software patch, it has
to first verify that the patch is signed by a DNO’s approval
body.
4.5 Tamper-resistant Credential Protection
Most field devices are deployed in remote geographic lo-
cations exposed to unauthorised physical access. Therefore,
it is important to provide protection against unauthorised
modification and disclosure of sensitive information, such
as digital certificates and cryptographic keys, in these de-
vices. An efficient solution to provide the required level of
protection for keying materials within field devices is to use
a FIPS140-validated tamper-resistant, special-purpose cryp-
tographic module, such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
A TPM is a secure crypto-processor that offers functionali-
ties for secure generation and storage of cryptographic keys
[6]. In addition to serving as tamper-proof storage to sen-
sitive data like cryptographic keys and digital certificates,
[11] discusses additional security benefits of using TPM for
smart grid devices. Some of the benefits include secure soft-
ware upgrade, high assurance booting, dynamic attestation
of running software and device attestation.
4.6 Event Logging and Intrusion Detection
Even after the above security solutions are put in place,
there can still be security incidents. Incidents could happen
because an attacker installs a malware by exploiting zero-day
vulnerabilities, which are inevitable in software. Incidents
could also happen because of a field engineer’s negligence
to follow a DNO’s security policy that prohibit the usage
of removable media, such as USB, without a proper check
for malware prior to use. Besides, disgruntled insiders can
abuse their privileges to perform malicious operations.
To minimise the risks that result from such incidents, a
DNO should implement automated intrusion-detection tech-
niques to monitor events that occur in the network and to
analyse them for signs of suspicious activities that violate
the DNO’s security policies and acceptable practices.
One type of intrusion detection is log-based intrusion de-
tection system (LIDS) [17]. LIDS uses log data from net-
work devices to detect suspicious activities in a device. This
intrusion detection requires each device in the network to
implement a secure logging mechanism that maintains a
record of system events and user activities in the device.
Log data must record noteworthy events such as user activ-
ity, program execution status, device configuration change,
etc. Each log entry for an event must also contain detailed
information about the event including identity of the user,
time of the event, type of the event, etc.
LIDS should be implemented both at a device level and
at a network level. For the network-level detection, devices
send duplicates of their log entries to a centralised logging
server. A postmortem analysis of the log files (at individual
devices and at a central logging server) is used to recon-
struct events and detect intrusions. The intrusion detection
system can, for example, identify insiders engaged in suspi-
cious activities and flag them as malicious.
Another type of intrusion detection is called network-based
intrusion detection system (NIDS) [17]. NIDS monitors traf-
fic directed towards critical components of the network to
detect suspicious traffic patterns such as denial of service
(DoS) attacks. The best location for a NIDS is to deploy it
in the same location where a firewall is deployed. In gen-
eral, distribution automation network traffic is more or less
predictable and follows regular traffic patterns, compared to
network traffic in enterprise systems. Therefore, a network-
based intrusion detection for such systems can be very ef-
fective in detecting intrusions.
Note that intrusion detection should be combined with
automated intrusion prevention systems (IPS) that send an
alarm when intrusions are detected and are capable of tak-
ing automated prevention measures, such as resetting the
connection and blocking traffic from offending IP address
where such actions do not have catastrophic consequences
on the grid’s operations. Moreover, the operator must have
proper incident response and disaster recovery procedures
in place to be able to rapidly recover from any emergency
(including a cyber attack) and to mitigate damage caused
by such incidents.
5. SECUREBOOTSTRAPPINGOFAFIELD
DEVICE
This section focuses on secure initialisation and certifi-
cation of a newly installed field device before it starts any
meaningful communication. This initial stage of securely
bootstrapping a field device is a precursor for the effective
implementation of the end-to-end security and secure soft-
ware patching solutions described in Section 4.
A secure device-installation scheme should guarantee that
the device comes from one of the trusted manufacturers
and that the installation is carried out by an authorised
field engineer. In other words, the scheme should prevent
a malicious outsider or an insider (field engineer), who is
suspected as malicious after postmortem log data analy-
sis, from installing a rogue field device. The installation
scheme described below assumes that each field device comes
with a certificate pre-provisioned by an accredited manufac-
turer’s certificate authority. Furthermore, we assume that
the DNO’s controllers, certificate authority and Device Reg-
istry (described below) know the public keys of all accred-
ited manufacturers whose devices are installed in the DNO’s
network.
Our installation scheme puts full trust on an authorised
field engineer to initialise a field device by securely loading
the public key of the DNO’s certificate authority and config-
uring some parameters such as disabling unnecessary ports
and changing insecure default settings. An alternative to
this would be for a DNO to have a safe central location where
all field devices are received and securely initialised with the
DNO’s certificates and a field engineer is merely responsible
for plugging the device into the network and setting some
parameters. In this paper, the first option is chosen because
we assume that a DNO might not always have pre-initialised
devices that are readily available for use during emergency
conditions. Thus we want to make it possible for a field
engineer to be able to take uninitialised field devices (for ex-
ample, borrow them from a neighbouring DNO or buy them
from the closest vendor available) and securely install these
devices to the network whenever required.
5.1 Device Installation During Normal Oper-
ations
In this subsection we describe the set of procedures re-
quired to securely install a field device in a distribution net-
work when communication is possible from the installation
location to the DNO’s network management centre. The
network management centre comprises among other compo-
nents the AAA server, the DNO’s certificate authority and
the Device Registry, as depicted in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: An active distribution network’s commu-
nication infrastructure and a network management
module that facilitates secure communication.
A successful secure installation of a field device entails
execution of the following three steps before the device par-
ticipates in any communicating session.
• A field engineer is authenticated by the central AAA
server and obtains an authorisation token for installing
the device into the network.
• An authorised field engineer registers the device as a
member of the distribution network in a central data-
base called Device Registry. This database contains
a list of all devices in the network and a metadata of
each device.
• The device is issued a certificate by the DNO’s certifi-
cate authority. A certificate is issued only after the
CA verifies that the device has a valid certificate from
an accredited manufacturer and that the device is reg-
istered at the Device Registry by an authorised field
engineer.
User authorisation for installing a device can be accom-
plished by utilising any token/ticket based standard authen-
tication protocols such as Security Assertion Markup Lan-
guage (SAML) or Kerberos. In this case we will use SAML
to describe how the installation proceeds.
To install a device, an engineer performs the required ini-
tial configurations on the device and plugs it into the net-
work. He then authenticates himself to the AAA server and
is issued a SAML assertion (SAML security token) by the
server. A SAML security token is an XML file that speci-
fies whom it is issued to, what privileges the token holder
has (registering a device as a member of the network). The
token also contains information about its lifetime (validity
period) and a digital signature signed by the token issuer
(AAA server) in order to guarantee its integrity.
Once an engineer receives the security token, he initiates
the device registration process. The registration proceeds
only if the Device Registry verifies that the device comes
from a trusted manufacturer and the engineer has the priv-
ilege of registering it. The Device Registry verifies the au-
thenticity of the device by using the certificate issued by its
manufacturer. The certificate is also used to initiate a se-
cure session with the server. The engineer then sends the
device’s metadata along with the SAML security token to
the Device Registry over the secure channel.
After a successful verification of the token’s validity, the
Device Registry assigns a unique ID to the device and cre-
ates a new entry for the device’s metadata in its database.
Note that a successful verification of the token guarantees
the Device Registry that the engineer is trusted by the AAA
server. The Device Registry then confirms a successful com-
pletion of the registration by sending back the unique ID to
the device.
Upon receiving the unique device ID, the device again
authenticates itself to the DNO’s certificate authority (CA)
and initiates a secure session by using the certificate issued
by its manufacturer. A certificate request is then sent to
the CA over the secure channel. The CA checks if there
is an entry in the Device Registry database corresponding
to the device ID that is received as part of the certificate
request. If such an entry exists, the CA is convinced that the
authenticated device requesting for a certificate is registered
by a trusted field engineer. Therefore, the CA signs a new
certificate and sends it back to the requesting device.
Now that the device has a certificate issued by the DNO’s
CA, it can authenticate itself to any communicating partner
in the distribution network and initiate secure communica-
tion with them using standard protocols such as TLS or
IPsec.
5.2 Device Installation During Emergency Con-
ditions
When an island controller (IC) detects a widespread dis-
turbance or power failure in the grid, the active distribution
subnetwork within the controller’s domain can automati-
cally isolate itself from the grid and continue to operate as
an island for an extended duration of time. It is possible that
portions of the grid’s communication infrastructure beyond
the island’s perimeter could be rendered unreachable as a
result of the disturbance that caused the islanding. A sub-
network of a distribution communication infrastructure can
also be isolated (islanded) due to a communication break-
down, irrespective of a power system failure. During such
emergency situations, a DNO might want to replace some
failed field devices within the islanded region. However, if
the DNO’s network management centre is unreachable from
the island, the device installation procedure described above
cannot be applied.
Therefore, it is important to design a secure device in-
stallation scheme to prevent an attacker from exploiting
the emergency situation in order to install a rogue device
in the island. In the following we discuss an out-of-band
challenge-response-based user-authentication scheme to se-
curely install a device within an island. The scheme utilises
the island controller (IC) to serve as a proxy for the security
operations required during device installation. For this we
assume each island controller knows the public key of the
AAA server and the public key of the CA’s of all accredited
manufacturers whose devices are installed in the network.
Furthermore, we assume that each IC is sufficiently secure
to be delegated as a subordinate certificate authority for is-
suing temporary certificates to devices installed within the
island during the emergency situation.
With these assumptions, the installation of a device in an
islanded network proceeds as follows. The engineer first con-
figures the device and plugs it into the network. Then the
device uses the manufacturer issued certificate to authen-
ticate itself and to setup a secure session with the island
controller (IC). The device’s metadata is then sent to the
IC over the secure channel. Before locally registering the
device’s metadata, the IC replies with a random challenge
(nonce) to prove that an authorised engineer is registering
the device.
Assuming there exists an out-of-band means of communi-
cation (for example, a mobile network) from the island to
the network management centre, the engineer authenticates
himself to the AAA server using his mobile phone and re-
quests the server for an authorisation token by forwarding
the random challenge. Depending on which privileges the
engineer has, he receives a signature of the random chal-
lenge signed by the AAA server. This signature is sent to
the controller as a proof that the engineer is trusted by the
AAA server to register a device. The controller then verifies
the signature and accepts the device as part of the network
by registering its metadata until communication with the
network management centre is restored.
If, for some reason, the engineer in the island has lost his
password or is unable to login to the AAA server, he can still
install the device with the help of any other engineer who is
in a location where he can communicate both to the network
management centre and to the island. The only purpose of
the engineer in the island is to forward the random challenge
to the second engineer and receive the signature from him
to use it in order to finish the registration of the device
(Figure 4). This way, the engineer in the island serves as
a delegate to the authenticated engineer for registering the
device. Note that the delegation is accomplished without
revealing the authenticated user’s password to the delegated
engineer.
After the device is successfully registered, the island con-
troller issues it with a new certificate. The device uses this
certificate to authenticate and to securely communicate with
other devices in the island. Other devices can verify the au-
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Figure 4: Islanding - where a portion of an active
distribution network is cut off from the rest of the
main grid. A DNO securely installs new devices
in the island in the presence of malicious outsiders
or suspected insiders who would like to utilize the
emergency situation to install rogue devices.
thenticity of the certificate by building a chain of trust start-
ing from the device’s certificate up to the root CA (trust
anchor) of the DNO. Note that the signing key of the island
controller is certified by the root CA and the public key of
the root CA is preloaded to every device during installation.
The above description considers a single island controller
per island. However, an island can be a superset of multiple
islands with each member island having its own island con-
troller. In such a situation, the different island controllers
need to run a decision protocol among them to select a
“master” controller which will be responsible for the tasks
described above.
5.3 Back Synchronization of an Island
When the fault that caused islanding is cleared, the is-
landed facility synchronises back to the main grid [4]. The
devices that are installed during an islanded operation are
not recognised by the central Device Registry and do not
yet have a certificate issued by the root certificate author-
ity. The devices can still continue to communicate using the
certificate issued to them by the island controller. However,
building a chain of trust to verify such certificates can be
complicated during another islanding incident. For example,
assume a ”master“ controller issued a certificate to a device
during a previous islanding. Furthermore, assume the device
is now in another island that does not contain the previous
“master” controller. If the device wants to securely commu-
nicate with another partner within the current island, the
communicating partner will not be able to build the chain
of trust for the device’s certificate. To ease this complexity,
we propose that each device be re-certified by the root CA,
once the connection with the network management centre is
restored. The re-certification can be automated as follows.
First the IC forwards the temporarily stored metadata of
these devices to the Device Registry over a secure channel.
The Device Registry creates a new entry for each of these
devices in its database. Following this, each such device
auto-requests the CA for a certificate. The CA, upon suc-
cessful verification of the existence of an entry for requesting
the device in the Device Registry’s database, issues a new
certificate to it.
5.4 Securing Legacy Devices
The distribution automation network will contain not only
new advanced field devices but also legacy devices, which do
not have enough computational power or memory space to
perform security functionalities. Communication with such
legacy devices should be secured by installing a modern secu-
rity device, also known as bump-in-the-wire (BITW) device,
adjacent to them [21]. The BITW device is issued a digital
certificate from the CA on behalf of the legacy device. All
security operations on data sent from and received by the
legacy device are performed in the BITW device. Note that
data transfer between the legacy device and the BITW is
not protected.
6. CONCLUSION
A smart grid’s communication infrastructure is key to en-
abling a utility to collect and analyse data about current
operating conditions of the grid and issue control signals as
required. However, the critical nature of power grid makes
its communication infrastructure a suitable target for cyber
attacks. Therefore, implementing a comprehensive cyber
security solution is necessary. In this paper we analysed dif-
ferent cyber security threats in a typical active distribution
network and proposed security solutions and best practices
to counter such threats. Our solution entails secure boot-
strapping of field devices such that only an authorised per-
sonnel is able to install such devices and no malicious insider
or outsider is able to install rogue field devices.
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